# What's so hard about DNSSEC?

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# Why use DNSSEC

### What does it solve?

Helps against cache poisoning

Identifies DNS "lying"

Enables DANE and other PKIs



## Naysayers' story

•It's "hard"

It only breaks things

It doesn't solve anything

We're trusting ICANN/root servers



### My experience

- Automate or it is hard
- It does help prevent cache poisoning
- We are using DANE already for email
- We're already trusting ICANN/root servers
- Customers starting to expect security of DNSSEC





# How to start?

#### The two halves

Validation

Zone signing



### **Validation**

Easy to enable

 But you pay (a little) for others' mistakes

 All major open sources packages support this.



## **Signing**

Automation is not an option

Automation ease and quality varies widely

Setting up isn't trivial

Beware of key rollovers





# Validation issues

## "But it's an ISP support nightmare"

Other folks screw up, you get the call

"Why are you blocking site 'X'?"

•It's your resolver, you fix it!



### Dunno... I sleep at night.

- Comcast & Google validate (20% of public resolvers)
- Comcast validates and signs
- •2 dozen failures a month is a bad month and this is improving (even .GOV...)
- NTAs (RFC 7646) single digits a month



### What do we see?

Expired signatures

Incorrect removal of signing

Inadvertent signing

Bad key rollovers (KSK)





# Signing issues

### What do we see?

 Initial signing works but rollovers don't

 Mis-matches of DS in parent and KSK in child

Forget to put DS in parent





# How do we deal with failures?

### **Education**

Training 1<sup>st</sup> tier

 Teach customers as we explain outage

dnsviz.net invaluable



### **Outreach**

Get .mil/.gov and other large NOC contacts in advance

 Get contacts at large hosting/ registries serving auth zones

Explain to your mgmt why this is important



## **Negative trust anchors**

•Follow the RFC (7646)

Try to get the zone owner to fix the problem

Educate them in how to avoid this

NTA should be last resort





# **Q & A**



# Thank you!

## Appendix A: further reading

- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6781
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7583
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7646
- http://www.internetsociety.org/ deploy360/dnssec/



To enable DNSSEC validation in BIND

```
// In named.conf, add:
managed-keys {
    "." 257 3 8 "AwEAAagAlKIVZrpC6la7gEzahOR+9W29euxhJhVVLOyQbSEW0O8gcCjF
FVQUTf6v58fLjwBd0YI0EzrAcQqBGCzh/RStloO8g0NfnfL2MTJRkxoX
bfDaUeVPQuYEhg37NZWAJQ9VnMVDxP/VHL496M/QZxkjf5/Efucp2gaD
X6RS6CXpoY68LsvPVjR0ZSwzz1apAzvN9dlzEheX7lCJBBtuA6G3LQpz
W5hOA2hzCTMjJPJ8LbqF6dsV6DoBQzgul0sGlcGOYl7OyQdXfZ57relS Qageu
+ipAdTTJ25AsRTAoub8ONGcLmgrAmRLKBP1dfwhYB4N7knNnulg QxA+Uk1ihz0=":
};
// in options section, add:
dnssec-enable yes;
dnssec-validation yes;
```



#### To enable DNSSEC signing of example.com in BIND

```
# create dir with permissions for bind to rwx by group
cd <YOUR-ZONE-FILE-DIR>
mkdir example.com
chmod 2775 example.com
chown bind:bind example.com
cd example.com
# create ksk
dnssec-keygen -a NSEC3RSASHA1 -b 2048 -f KSK example.com
# create zsk
dnssec-keygen -a NSEC3RSASHA1 -b 1024 example.com
# create DS records
grep key-s *.key
dnssec-dsfromkey Kexample.com.+007+42963.key > ds-records
# add DNSKEY records to zone file
# edit named.conf & reload zone
rndc reload example.com
# sign zone
rndc sign example.com
# set to NSEC3 (assuming you want that)
rndc signing -nsec3param 1 0 10 auto example.com
rndc reload example.com
# update registrar w/DS records or DNSKEY per your registrar instructions
```



Sample zone statement in named.conf

```
zone "example.com" {
    type master;
    file "dynamic/example.com";
    key-directory "keys/example.com";
    auto-dnssec maintain;
    allow-query { any; };
    allow-transfer { key example-slave-key; 192.168.1.1; };
};
```



- To enable DNSSEC validation in Knot resolver:
  - http://knot-resolver.readthedocs.io/en/latest/daemon.html
- To enable DNSSEC validation in Unbound:
  - https://www.unbound.net/documentation/howto\_anchor.html



- To DNSSEC sign zones in Knot:
  - https://www.knot-dns.cz/docs/2.x/html/configuration.html#automaticdnssec-signing
- To DNSSEC sign zones in Unbound:
  - (manually) <a href="http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/publications/dnssec\_howto/">http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/publications/dnssec\_howto/</a>
  - (automated) https://www.opendnssec.org/

