

Preparing for a DDoS Attack

Ronan Mullally, Akamai Technologies RIPE72, Copenhagen, May 2016

The Cloud...



What is a DDoS?



Where's your Umbrella?





Have a Plan

- Know what your options are
- Find out what upstreams can do to help and know how to use it
- Consider AUPs yours and your upstreams

Be nimble

- Low DNS TTLs on likely targets
- Put likely targets on independently routable prefixes
- Be able to quickly adapt your routing

2 - Be aware

Monitor everything

- Bit rate and packet rate via SNMP
- Netflow, Sflow, etc
- Peering portal stats
- Span ports / Taps

Know what's going on on your network

• Otherwise you're in the dark

Know what's going on downstream

- Your customer might want to see 43Gbps of NTP
- Or they might only want 80/tcp.

3 - Have a Robust DNS Infrastructure

If you (or your customer's) DNS is broken, so are you.

Don't make it an easy target:

;; ANSWER SECTION	l:				;; ANSWER SECTION	l:					
example.com.	14400	IN	NS	ns1.example.com.	akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a20-	-66 . ał	kam.net.
example.com.	14400	IN	NS	ns2.example.com.	akamai.com.	300 IN NS a2-66.akam.net.			am.net.		
					akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a3–6	6.aka	am.net.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:				akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a9–66.akam.net.			
ns1.example.com.	14400	IN	Α	a.b.c.10	akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a8–66.akam.net.		
ns2.example.com.	14400	IN	Α	a.b.c.140	akamai.com.	300 IN NS			a5–66.akam.net.		
					akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a11–66.akam.net.		
					akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a13–66.akam.net.		
					akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a1–66.akam.net.		
					akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a16-	-66 . ał	kam.net.
					akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a28-	-66 . ał	kam.net.
					akamai.com.	300	00 IN NS a12-66.aka		kam.net.		
					akamai.com.	300	00 IN NS		a7–66.akam.net.		
					;; ADDITIONAL SEC	; ADDITIONAL SECTION:					
					al-66.akam.net.		90000		IN	Α	193.108.91.66
					a1–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	AAAA	2600:1401:2::42
					a2–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	Α	95.100.174.66
					a3–66.akam.net.		9000	00	IN	А	96.7.49.66
					a5–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	А	95.100.168.66
					a7–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	А	23.61.199.66
					a8–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	А	2.16.40.66
					a8–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	AAAA	2600:1403:a::42
					a9–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	Α	184.85.248.66
					a11–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	А	84.53.139.66
					a12–66.akam.net.		90000		IN	Α	184.26.160.66

4 - A Firewall Will Not Save You

State Kills

The vast number of flows involved in a DDoS attack can easily overwhelm a stateful firewall

5 - Spread the pain

Have multiple paths over which traffic can arrive

A broader 'attack surface' gives you more options

You can apply different measures on different paths





The ISP View



The Customer View



7 - Mitigation Appliances

Many vendors offer on-premises appliances

- Typically fixed N Gbps of capacity
- Some come with 'cloud' capabilities to use resources upstream

They will help defeat some attacks, but:

- They can be expensive
- You still need big pipes to ingest the traffic
- Not every attack vector will suit every device
- You need a human element to drive effective mitigation
- and...



The N+1th Gbps is a killer



Some day you're going to need a bigger boat

9 - Use Somebody Else's



There are options to mitigate attacks before they reach your network

Upstream providers may offer a mitigation service, or...

10 - Pass the Buck (or Euro)

There are third-party alternatives:

Content Distribution Networks

- Push content out to a vast server footprint
- Primarily an end-user-experience / performance service
- But can also absorb DDoS attacks
- They do not suit all types of (legitimate) traffic

DDoS Protection Services

- Have connectivity and mitigation capacity to absorb large attacks
- They pass 'clean' or 'post mitigation' traffic back to you
- via proxy or a direct link (real or tunnelled)



- Be Prepared
- Be Nimble
- Be Aware
- Have Solid DNS
- Don't rely on state
- Know your limits